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Executive Summary
Critics of free trade often use Haiti as a poster 
child for failed trade liberalization policies. In 2010, 
15 years after the second round of trade liberali­
zation in Haiti, U.S. President Bill Clinton, who was 
instrumental in Haiti's trade negotiations, apolo­
gized for convincing Haiti to adopt liberalization 
policies. He said, "It may have been good for some 
of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. 
It was a mistake, I had to live every day with the 
consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a 
rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of 
what 1 did; nobody else" [Katz 2010],
Food insecurity has been a challenge in Haiti for 
more than 30 years. In 1986/87, almost 50 percent 
of households in a nationwide survey had less than 
75 percent of the recommended levels of food 
energy intake [Jensen, Johnson, and Stampley 
1990b], and in 2000 the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations [FAO] con­
cluded that Haiti had the third-highest caloric defi­
cit per person in the world, behind Somalia and 
Afghanistan. The most severe poverty and food 
insecurity were and continue to be in Haiti's rural 
areas (Jensen, Johnson, and Stampley 1990b; Institut 
HaTtien de I'Enfance and Macro International 2007],
Most analysts of Haitian food security agree that 
Haitian agriculture is constrained by low govern­
ment and donor investment, a limited amount of 
arable land in a mountainous country, small land- 
holdings due to inheritance divisions made with 
each generation, environmental deterioration, and 
poor infrastructure. Total agricultural output has 
stagnated or declined since the 1960s (FAO 2010).
Free-trade critics additionally argue that Haiti's 
food security problems in the 21st century are 
caused or exacerbated by the structural adjustment 
policies promoted by the World Bank and the In­
ternational Monetary Fund. These policies led Haiti 
to reduce rice tariffs from 50 to 3 percent, a shift 
that allowed large amounts of subsidized rice 
grown in the United States to enter the Haitian 
market, displacing Haitian-grown rice and destroy­
ing the livelihoods of rice farmers (McGuigan 
2006; IMF 2001).
This case explores the impact of Haiti's liberalized 
rice trade on food security in Haiti, identifies the 
policy's winners and losers, and considers the
historical and political context that contributed to 
these outcomes. Key stakeholders include Haitian 
rice sector workers, urban and rural consumers, 
the Haitian government, U.S. rice growers, and 
international institutions, including the Interna­
tional Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).
The government's policy options for reducing 
poverty and improving food security include rein­
stalling protections for rice farmers to boost 
domestic prices, investing in agriculture or agricul­
tural markets to increase crop yields and possibly 
exports, developing alternatives for urban and rural 
employment, and challenging cheap rice imports 
from the United States through the WTO.
It is 2006 and President-elect Rene Preval is about 
to start his second term as president. In the con­
text of the rice situation, you are asked to address 
him on how to reduce poverty and hunger 
throughout the country. The country successfully 
pursued improved macroeconomic stability during 
2004-2006 and is now in a better position to 
focus on reducing poverty and hunger as it pre­
pares its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Given 
the available statistics and their uncertainties, what 
would you advise him to do to reduce rural and 
urban poverty and hunger? How would your 
answer change in response to the food price crisis 
in 2007-2008?
Background
Structural Adjustment Programs and Trade 
Liberalization
In the 1980s and 1990s the World Bank and Inter­
national Monetary Fund (IMF) issued loans tied to 
structural adjustment program (SAPs), which 
required that recipient governments adopt certain 
macro- and microeconomic measures aimed at 
achieving price stability, more efficient resource 
use, and higher economic growth. Specific policies 
often included devaluation of overvalued currency, 
cutting of inflation, reduced public spending, pri­
vatization of services, dismantling of state enter­
prises, and lowered barriers to trade. The IMF has 
admitted that some of the poor in some low- 
income countries suffered from the SAPs in the 
short run but argued that later SAPs rectified the
earlier mistakes to reduce these negative effects and 
benefited many poor people in the medium and 
longer run [IMF 1999],
Trade liberalization was a key component of the 
SAPs. Recipient governments were urged to 
monetize nontariff barriers1 *and remove or lower all 
barriers to trade to increase market efficiency and 
assure lower food and basic commodity prices for 
consumers. Oxfam argues that if trade liberalization 
is "integrated into effective national strategies for 
poverty reduction," then "well-designed and 
properly sequenced trade reforms can create new 
opportunities for the poor" [Oxfam 2002, 122], In 
the case of Haiti, however, Oxfam and other SAP 
critics contend that rapid trade liberalization had 
disastrous effects and increased poverty and 
inequality [Oxfam 2002; McGuigan 2006],
Haiti's Political and Social Background
Haiti gained its independence from France in 1804 
to become the second independent nation in the 
Western Hemisphere. In 1957, Franqois "Papa Doc" 
Duvalier was elected president, and in 1964 he 
declared himself "president for life," ruling Haiti 
until his death in 1971. His son, Jean-CIaude 
Duvalier, took over after his death, but amid cor­
ruption and violence he was forced to flee the 
country in 1986. The first trade liberalization oc­
curred in 1986/87. After a series of provisional 
governments, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected 
president in 1990, in what some claimed to be the 
first free and fair election ever held in Haiti [Taft- 
Morales and Ribando 2007], Aristide was over­
thrown in a military coup nine months later, lead­
ing to political upheaval. Between 1986 and 2005 
the presidency changed hands 15 times, only 4 of 
which included public elections.
"The Crisis": 1991-1994 Embargo
After the coup sent Aristide into exile in 1991, the 
United States and the Organization of American 
States (OAS) initiated economic sanctions against 
the military junta in an attempt to squeeze them 
out of power. The embargo was eventually ex­
panded to prohibit most imports and exports as 
well as foreign aid to the de facto government 
[Gibbons and Garfield 1999], Some foods were
exempt from the embargo, but agricultural inputs 
including fertilizer and seeds were included in trade 
restrictions. The embargo period, called "The Cri­
sis" by the Haitian people, had devastating conse­
quences for almost every sector in the Haitian 
economy, reducing per capita gross domestic 
product [GDP] by more than 40 percent in four 
years' time. At the end of the embargo, per capita 
GDP [in current U.S. dollars] was lower than it had 
been in 1980 [Figure 1], About two-thirds of Haiti's 
garment factories were forced to close. Agricul­
tural production dropped 17 percent between 1991 
and 1994 [World Bank 1998], Nonfarm rural enter­
prises collapsed. By comparison, the 1986 coup that 
overthrew Jean-CIaude Duvalier had relatively little 
impact on GDP.
After the restoration of the Aristide government, 
liberalization of trade, and resumption of social and 
economic order in 1995, GDP began to recover, 
and since then it has increased or decreased 
according to the level of political security. In 1999, 
when the government was negotiating to enter the 
Caribbean economic community [CARICOM], it 
had the opportunity to increase its tariffs to match 
those of the region [which was 40 percent for 
agricultural products] and decided to maintain its 
low tariffs.
General Statistics
In 2005 Haiti's population was estimated to be 9.4 
million, with the highest population density in the 
Western Hemisphere [World Bank 2010], [See 
selected indicators in Table 1.] Seventy-six percent 
of Haitians live on less than US$2 a day, 55 percent 
live on less than US$1 a day [WFP 2010], and 27 
percent of the population is considered "ultra 
poor," living on less than 50 cents a day [Ahmed 
et al. 2007], Its population has been urbanizing at a 
rate similar to that of Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 
1990 and 1998, the urban population grew from 29 
to 34 percent [Ahmed et al. 2007], The rest of 
Latin American and the Caribbean [LAC] region 
urbanized at a slightly slower rate during that time, 
but this is not surprising given that 71 percent of 
the population of LAC was urbanized by 1990 
[Ahmed et al. 2007],
1 That is, they were asked to replace nontariff barriers,
such as quotas and licensing regulations, with tariffs that
would achieve a similar level of protection.
Figure 1: Haiti's per Capita GDP, 1970-2006 (current US$)
Source: United Nations Statistics Division,
http:/ / data.un.org/Da ta.aspx?a=haiti+gdp8Td=SNAAMASi:f=grlD%3alOI%3bcurrlD%3aUSD%3bpcFlag%3al%3bc 
rlD%3a332.
Three household surveys supported by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development [USAID] 
conducted in 1994/95, 2000 , and 2 0 0 5 /0 6  reveal 
that male rural unemployment2 was about the same 
in 1994/95 as in 2 0 0 5 /0 6  but dropped in urban 
areas during that same period. In 1994/95 agricul­
tural work was the primary activity of 69 percent 
of rural men, but by 2005 /2006  56 percent of 
rural men were working in agriculture, a general 
trend common to  LAC [Institut Hai'tien de 
I'Enfance and Macro International 1995, 2007; Aide 
and Grau 2004].3
Food Security and Nutrition
The 1986/87 Haitian Household Consumption and 
Expenditure Survey found that almost 50 percent
2 This figure is based on self-reporting in response to the 
question "Have you done any work in the last 12 
months?"
3 DHS surveys are nationally and regionally representative 
every five years. The sampling frame changes for each 
survey, which could distort unemployment and type of 
employment data if there was migration from rural areas 
into urban areas.
of households had less than 75 percent of the 
recommended levels of food energy intake and 36 
percent had under 75 percent of the recommended 
daily allowance for protein [Jensen, Johnson, and 
Stampley 1990b], National-level data reveal that the 
amount of food available per person per day has 
never exceeded 2,000 kilocalories4 [Figure 2]. 
Analysis of Haiti's production and import5 6* data 
shows an average caloric deficit of 331 kilocalories 
per capita from 1976 to  19856 [Deaton and Siaway 
1988], about 530 kilocalories from 1986 to  1995, 
and 400  kilocalories since then [Figure 2].
4 The World Health Organization [WHO] defines con­
sumption of less than 2,100 kilocalories per person per 
day as an "unsatisfactory situation" [WHO 2000].
5 it is unclear from Deaton and Siaway [1988] if imports 
include commercial imports only or commercial inputs 
and food aid.
6 This calculation uses a weighted population average for 
age and sex composition between 1971 and 1995 [pro­
jected] compared with recommended dietary allowances
for the Caribbean. Based on this calculation, it was 
determined that Haiti needed 2,270 calories per capita.
In 1986/87 rural households spent 62 percent of 
their budgets on food whereas urban households 
spent 40 percent (Jensen, Johnson, and Stampley 
1990b]. Rice consisted of just over 15.4 percent of 
the energy in the overall Haitian diet, followed by 
oils, dried peas, and crushed maize, though urban 
areas relied slightly more on rice than rural areas 
did (Jensen, Johnson, and Stampley 1990b], In 2001, 
food expenses were estimated to be 50.2 percent 
of an urban household's budget and 64.2 percent 
of a rural household's budget (IHSI 2001], a modest 
increase for rural households and a significant 
increase for urban ones.
The number of children who were wasted (or ema­
ciated] decreased almost 50 percent in the 1980s 
but returned to  its original level during the em­
bargo. Mulder-Sibanda (1998] blames this increase 
on the collapse of public services and political 
violence during this period. The 2 0 0 5 /0 6  DHS 
survey showed that wasting had decreased about 3 
percent between 1994/95 and 2000  but increased 
4.6 percent between 2000  and 2005 /06 . In both 
the 1978 and 2 0 0 4 /0 5  surveys, the Artibonite 
Department,7 the largest rice-producing region in 
Haiti, had the highest percentage of severely wasted 
children (6.8 percent] (Graitcer et al. 1980].
1 Haiti has 10 administrative "departments," similar to 
U.S. states.
Haitian Agriculture
Numerous reports written about Haiti in the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s describe Haitian agriculture as 
"stagnant" and showing "negative growth for some 
time" (USAID 1985], The FAO estimated that
6 ,000 hectares of arable land, or 0.7 percent of 
arable land, were being lost to  soil erosion annually 
(USAID 1985]. One-third of all land was in an "ex­
tremely degraded state" in the mid-1990s (White 
and Jickling 1994].
Since independence, when French-owned planta­
tions were divided among newly emancipated slaves, 
small-scale farmers have made up the majority of 
producers. With land further subdivided each gen­
eration, by 2001 average plot sizes were less than a 
one-quarter hectare8 (Smith 2001, 229], These ex­
tremely small landholdings, as well as population 
pressure, have contributed to  the need to  convert 
marginal land (often steep slopes] to  agriculture. 
This conversion of marginal land, massive defores­
tation, and the need to  grow crops on land each 
year contribute to  soil erosion and partially explain 
Haiti's low yields (White and Jickling 1994], This 
severe land degradation makes Haiti extremely vul­
nerable to natural disasters such as tropical storms 
and hurricanes. Other barriers to growth in Haitian 
agriculture include a lack of "agricultural support 
services, such as new land technologies, market 
information, plant material, credit or training of 
any type" (World Bank 1998,1-2].
8 Approximately 0.61 acre.
educational purposes without express permission but must include 
is permitted without permission.
Table 1: Selected Demographic and Nutritional Indicators for Haiti
In d ica to r So u rce I9 7 0 s/ I9 8 0 s 1990s 2 0 0 0 s
Share of urban 
population [%)
World Bank [2010) 20.5 28.5 42.7
Rural unemployment 
[%>
Institut HaTtien de 
I'Enfance and 
Macro
International [1995, 
2007)
n.a. 25.3 24.2
Urban unemployment 
[%]
Institut HaTtien de 
I'Enfance and 
Macro
International [1995, 
2007)
n.a. 53.7 39.7
Percentage employed 
in agriculture in rural 
areas
Institut HaTtien de 
I'Enfance and 
Macro
International [1995, 
2007)
n.a. 63.9 56.3
Prevalence of wasted 
children under age 5
Graitcer et al. 
[1980); Institut 
HaTtien de 
I'Enfance and 
Macro
International [1995, 
2007); Institut 
HaTtien de 
I'Enfance and ORC 
Macro [2001)
6% [under 
80% weight 
for height)
7.8 4.6(2000)
9.2 (2004/2005)
Proportion of 
undernourished [%)
FAO [2009) 48 64 53
Number of
undernourished
[million)
FAO [2009) 2.6 4.5 4.6
a Unemployment in Demographic and Health Surveys is defined as not having worked in the 12 months before the survey. 
Note: n.a. indicates not available.
Sugarcane, cassava, bananas, and mangoes are the 
four most-produced crops by volume in Haiti, and 
coffee is the highest-value agricultural export [FAO 
2010], Agriculture's contribution to GDP declined 
almost every year between 1994 and 2005 except 
for 2001, when it increased, and 2003, when it did 
not change. Industry has decreased in importance 
at a similar rate while the share of GDP supplied by 
services grew almost 14 percent [IMF 1998, 2001, 
2005). The government allocated 4 percent of its 
annual budget to agriculture between 2000 and 
2005 [World Bank 2008).
IMF/World Bank Trade Liberalization
Historically, Haiti restricted imports of certain agri­
cultural products to protect farmers' incomes. As 
part of SAPs, however, Haiti undertook two rounds 
of trade liberalization, first in 1986/87 and then in 
1994/95. The 1986/87 round eliminated export 
taxes on coffee and most import and export 
licensing restrictions, dismantled government trad­
ing monopolies, and removed all restrictions on 
agricultural imports excluding rice and six other 
domestically produced foods [maize, millet, beans,
sugar, chicken parts, and pork meat]. These 
products remained subject to  import licensing and 
new ad valorem tariffs,9 but not to formal quantity 
restrictions [Jensen et al. 1991], A  50 percent im­
port tariff on rice replaced the fixed-value import 
duty [US$170 per metric ton], and imported rice 
became subject to  a 10 percent sales tax [Jensen et 
al. 1991], The second round of trade liberalization, 
implemented in February 1995, lifted remaining im­
port restrictions for the seven previously protected 
products, and import tariffs on these commodities 
were all reduced to  less than 5 percent [IMF 2001],
Did Haiti have a choice about whether or not to 
accept trade liberalization? Marie Michelle Rey, the 
minister of finance in 1994, later said that Haiti 
needed the money from the IMF and thus did not 
have a choice: "It was a must. If you don't have an 
agreement with the IMF, you're dead in the water. 
You can't do anything" [Regan 2003], Rey went on 
to say that even though the government did not 
have much choice about accepting trade liberaliza­
tion, "the consumer wins" from these policies be­
cause food and basic commodities are made more 
affordable [Regan 2003]. The IMF claimed that it 
supported trade liberalization but did not specifi­
cally require Haiti to  reduce tariffs on rice and was 
not involved in any decision about when or how 
much to reduce the tariffs [IMF 2008].
By 1999 the IMF ranked Haiti as the least trade- 
restrictive country in the Caribbean, though this 
ranking clearly did not translate into economic 
growth. The IMF [2001] acknowledges that Haiti 
has not benefited as much as it could have from 
liberal trade policies but argues that political insta­
bility, corruption, and insecurity plagued Haiti for 
years following Duvalier's departure, preventing 
Haiti from implementing structural reforms in 
other crucial areas and maximizing benefits from 
the SAPs.
Effects of Trade Liberalization on the 
Haitian Rice Sector
Although much has been written about the effect 
of trade liberalization on Haiti's rice sector, official 
reports acknowledge that many of the available 
agricultural related data are "somewhat imprecise" 
and urge caution in interpreting them [IMF 1995; 
Deaton and Siaway 1988], Haitian Ministry of
9 Ad valorem tariffs assess fees based on the value of the 
imported good, rather than its weight or amount.
Agriculture data often differ from those of aid 
donors, international organizations, or private con­
sultants. Incomplete coverage, outdated activity 
surveys, poor data collection, variability in yields, 
intercropping, and direct consumption by the far­
mer are some of the reasons that precise analysis of 
the situation is difficult [IMF 1995],
As described, Haiti's political and economic history 
is enormously complex. Although this history 
directly and indirectly affects food security, it is 
often neglected in food policy and trade analysis. 
When fully considered, however, this background 
makes claims about the effect of trade on food 
insecurity nearly impossible to  prove because there 
are so many other confounding variables. A second 
often-neglected point in analysis on this topic is 
that conclusions about the effect of trade on food 
insecurity and poverty depend heavily on which 
years are selected for comparison. The effects of 
the 1986/87 and 1994/95 liberalizations cannot be 
fully determined by looking only at differences 
between adjacent years because at the same time 
governments were changing hands, inflation was 
high, and, during the latter period, the embargo 
ended. Generalizations based only on these years 
are thus misleading. As much as available data per­
mit, therefore, this case study tries to  present the 
entire course from 1980 to  2005, referring to  key 
transition points and periods as needed and pre­
senting significant differences in estimates.
Em ploym ent
There are no reliable estimates for the number of 
rice farmers in Haiti before 1994. FAO and Oxfam 
estimates for the late 1990s concur that the num­
ber of people employed in the rice sector did not 
significantly decrease between 1994 and 2005. In 
2005, the rice sector was estimated to  employ 
almost 100,000 people [approximately 0.6 percent 
of the population] including 60 ,000  growers,
30 ,000  farm laborers, 350 millers, and 8,200 rural 
wholesalers [IDB 2005 report cited in FEWSNET 
2010],
Figure 3 : R ice Production Estim ates, 19 80-2005
Source: Compiled by authors based on data from the Haiti Ministry of Agriculture and Customs Agency as 
reported in IMF [2001] for all years between 1986 and 1999 except 1993/94. Data for 1993/94 were taken from 
IMF [1996]. No other Ministry of Agriculture data could be located.
Rice Production and Consum ption 
Seventy-five to eighty percent of Haitian-produced 
rice is grown in the Artibonite Valley [Deaton and 
Siaway 1988; McGuigan 2006], Ministry of 
Agriculture [IMF 2001] and FAO [FAO 2010] 
estimates of total rice production vary significantly 
(Figure 3]. The Haitian Ministry of Agriculture re­
ported a 36 percent decrease in rice production 
between 1987/8810 and 1989/90 and a second de­
crease of 28 percent between 1992/93 and 1994/95. 
FAO data showed that production was already 
much lower in 1986 and exhibited a similar decrease 
during the embargo. Both estimates showed that 
production rebounded significantly and temporarily 
immediately after the 1994/95 season. In 2007 (not 
shown], rice production was higher than in 1980 
(FAO 2010],
Production trends were similar for other domesti­
cally grown cereals such as corn and sorghum. 
Between 1993 and 1994 production dropped 16 and 
23 percent for corn and sorghum, respectively, but
10 Ministry of Agriculture data are calculated according 
to a fiscal year ending September 30. FAO data are 
based on the calendar year.
rebounded about 25 percent in 1995/96 according 
to  Ministry of Agriculture statistics (IMF 1996, 
1998],
FAO [2010] data show that the amount of Haitian 
land planted in rice increased between 1961 and 
2008 whereas yield per hectare increased somewhat 
in the 1970s before falling in the 1980s and 1990s 
to  yields similar to  those of the 1960s.
Urban Haitians have always eaten more rice than 
rural Haitians, and both populations now eat more 
rice than before trade liberalization (Jensen et al. 
1991; FEWSNET 2010], In the 2000s, national rice 
consumption in Haiti was estimated at 40 0 ,0 0 0  
metric tons (FEWSNET 2010], with U.S. imports 
making up 48 percent of rice needs in 1995 and 84 
percent in 2005 (USDA 2010]. By 2001, Miami 
rice constituted up to  80 percent of rice for sale all 
over Haiti and up to  9 0 -95  percent in the capital 
(IMF 2001; FEWSNET 2010],
2 0 0 8  Fo od  Price C risis
The sensitive nature of rice consumption and con­
sumer welfare can be seen in the civil unrest that 
erupted in four Haitian cities during the 2008
international food price crisis. In one major Port- 
au-Prince market, imported rice and local corn 
prices were approximately SS percent higher in 
April 2008 than in April 2007, driving food prices 
out of reach for middle- and low-income Haitians 
in both rural and urban areas [FEWSNET 2008]. 
The riots in April 2008 prompted the Senate to 
pass a vote of no confidence in the country's prime 
minister. The seat was left vacant through June 
2008, a situation that delayed the start-up, moni­
toring, and coordination of programs aimed at 
those affected by the food crisis. The riots forced 
the president to  establish temporary subsidies on 
imported rice, gas, and fertilizer. In 2009, following 
the crisis, donors and the government more than 
doubled their investment in agriculture compared 
with 2006 [OECD 2010],
Policy Issues
Rice Imports
Imported rice is called "Miami rice" in Haiti because 
American exports to  Haiti are frequently shipped 
from the port of Miami. Figure 4 shows rice im­
ports from the United States together with the
production data from Figure 3. USDA data show a 
clear rise in U.S. rice exports to  Haiti beginning in 
1986. The largest percentage increases in imports 
occurred in 1986-87, 1993-95, and 2 0 02-04 . By 
contrast, U.S. wheat exports to  Haiti rose quickly 
to  150 million tons in 1987 and remained near that 
level from 1985 to  2003, excepting during the 
embargo.
Rice Price Trends in Haiti
Even before the first round of liberalization in 1986, 
increases in cereal prices led to  urban unrest 
multiple times between 1976 and 1986 [Deaton and 
Siaway 1988], Cereal price increases initially slowed 
following the 1986 trade liberalization, but during 
the 1991-94 embargo, rice prices rose 137 percent 
and corn prices 184 percent. The government 
lacked external financing, so in an attempt to  pay 
down its deficit, it printed money, leading to mas­
sive inflation. The inflation and increasing cost of 
living were part of the reason that Haitian authori­
ties reduced tariffs to  the extent they did in the 
1994/95 trade liberalization [IMF 2001].
Figure 4: H aitian R ice Production and R ice Im ports from  the U nited  States, 1980-2008
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Source: Compiled by authors based on data from the Haiti Ministry of Agriculture and Customs Agency as 
reported in IMF [2001] for all years between 1986 and 1999 except 1993/94. Data for 1993/94 were taken from 
IMF [1996], No other Ministry of Agriculture data could be located. Data on imports are from USDA (2010).
To understand the impact of imported rice on the 
price of rice sold in Haiti over time, one must 
analyze the "real," inflation-adjusted price [rather 
than the "nominal" price, which is not adjusted for 
inflation]. A frequent but misleading claim made by 
trade critics is that the price of rice increased for 
consumers after liberalization. This claim is often 
based on nominal, not real, prices.
Figures S and 6 compare domestic and imported 
rice prices with those for corn and wheat from 1991 
to  2004, using an index to  allow for easier com­
parison of the different cereals over time. Cereal 
prices closely followed each other, which is not 
surprising because both imported and domestic 
rice compete with other cereals, including corn and 
wheat. If the price of wheat, for instance, falls, con­
sumers will increase their purchases of wheat and 
decrease their purchases of other grains, and this 
shift will tend to move prices back together. This 
tendency does not mean that prices must be equal, 
but rather that they will generally follow similar
trends. Such was the case following the 1986 trade 
liberalization, when it is argued not only that high 
domestic cereal prices drove the need for wheat 
and flour imports, but also that cheap wheat im­
ports then slowed the rate of rice and corn price 
increases [Fass 1988],
Figure 6 shows that when prices are adjusted for 
inflation, they decreased over time. There was an 
increase in prices between 2002 and 2004, but this 
rise was likely due to  political instability around this 
time. Both graphs show that the price of Haitian- 
grown rice fluctuates more than those of corn, 
sorghum, and Miami rice.
Although price plays an essential role in consumer 
choices, so do personal and cultural preferences. 
Haitians often say that Haitian-grown rice is better 
tasting and more nutritious than imported rice. 
The authors could find no evidence to  support this 
nutritional claim, but this perception can contri­
bute to  consumption patterns.
Figure 5 : In d ex o f N om inal Cereal Prices in  H a iti, 1991-2004
■IViami Rice 
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Note: Miami rice price data could not be found for 1998-2000 and 2002-2004. 
Sources: IMF [1996,2001,2005],
Figure 6 : Index o f Real Cereal Prices in  H a iti, 1991-2004
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Sources: Same as Figure 5; inflation data from World Bank [2010],
Domestic Production versus Imports
A t the heart of the policy issue are questions of 
food security and food self-sufficiency. It is often 
said that before the era of free trade Haiti was food 
self-sufficient, but that since trade liberalization it 
has imported the majority of its food. In 2004, 
roughly 52 percent of all food in Haiti was im­
ported, 43 percent was locally grown, and 5 per­
cent came as food aid [CNSA 2004]. However, 
Haiti has always been a net importer of some 
commodities, such as vegetable oils and wheat, but 
did not become a net importer of cereals until after 
1994/95 trade liberalization [FAO 2010],
It is true that overall, less of Haiti's food was im­
ported in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the 1978 
and 1986/87 national nutrition and consumption 
surveys showed high rates of poverty, food 
insecurity, and malnutrition [Graitcer et al. 1980; 
Jensen, Johnson, and Stampley 1990b], The caloric 
deficits discussed earlier show that although more 
of the food consumed in Haiti was grown locally, 
the country has not been food self-sufficient for 
more than 50 years [Deaton and Siaway 1988],
According to  FAO data, rice production remained 
within a fairly narrow band from 1980 to 2008. 
This is surprising given that there was a more than
7,000 percent increase in rice imported into Haiti
during this time. Some observers have argued that 
imports and production are negatively correlated 
[Figure 4]—as imports increased, local production 
decreased. However, available data show that the 
short-term increases in local production do not 
correspond with short-term decreases in imports 
and vice versa. For example, a large increase in 
production such as in 1997 [FAO data] resulted in 
no comparable drop in imports. The 2001 and 
2005 import spikes occurred with no apparent 
drop in production.
Rice Subsidies in the United States
The United States is the world's fourth-Iargest 
exporter of rice, and Haiti is one of its four most 
important rice importers [OECD 2006, 46, Figure 
2.9]. Between 1995 and 2004, the United States 
spent an annual average of US$1 billion on rice sub­
sidies—roughly 72 percent of the cost of produc­
tion—making rice one of the country's most sub­
sidized commodities [Griswold 2006; Oxfam 
2005]. The U.S. government supports domestic 
rice production by implementing tariffs on im­
ported rice and subsidizing domestic production 
though direct payments, countercyclical payments, 
and marketing assistance loans based on levels of 
production, prices, and historical acreage planted 
[Griswold 2006], It is estimated that these subsidies 
allow farmers to grow rice below market cost and
then export it to global markets, depressing global 
rice prices by 4 -6  percent [Sumner 2005, 21].
The exact effects on prices in Haiti are not known. 
It is clear, however, that the price at which the 
U.S.-grown rice is sold in Haiti is lower than it 
would be without the U.S. subsidies. Recall from 
Figures 5 and 6 that the prices of the principle 
grains consumed in Haiti track each other closely. 
Although a removal of U.S. subsidies would in­
crease the price of Miami rice, economic forces 
would likely spread that increase into other foods, 
including the price of Haitian rice. This secondary 
increase in the price of Haitian rice would give 
Haitian farmers greater incentives to increase yields, 
production, or both. It is possible, therefore, that 
U.S. subsidies could thus benefit even Haitians who 
consume no imported rice by lowering the prices 
of other foods while harming all Haitian agri­
culturalists who produce any food that competes 
with Miami rice.
Stakeholders
Haitian Rice Farmers
Rice farmers, most of whom are concentrated in 
the Artibonite Valley, are directly affected by trade 
liberalization. With relative rice prices dropping in 
the late 1990s, farmers likely saw a decrease in 
income from rice production. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many farmers in the Artibonite 
Valley have switched from growing two crops of 
rice each year to growing one crop of rice in 
summer and one crop of melons, plantains, or 
some other food in winter [FEWSNET 2005]. This 
pattern occurs partly because the current irrigation 
infrastructure cannot meet all of the needs of the 
rice farmers and because labor costs for these 
products are less than they are for rice [FEWSNET 
2005], To the extent that farmers are able to 
switch into producing other commodities, they can 
reduce their potential losses from falling rice prices. 
Switching to other commodities, however, requires 
knowledge, inputs, and markets.
Rural versus Urban Consumers
Urban consumers, who are net food buyers, bene­
fit from lower relative prices of food. With 
increasing urban populations and high inflation, 
keeping food prices low is a government priority, 
even if this policy comes at the expense of rice
producers. Opening the market to cheaper im­
ported rice has lowered rice prices relative to what 
they would have been without imports and tariff 
reductions. It has also benefited urban consumers 
by lowering the prices of other grains on the 
market.
Rural consumers can be either net rice sellers or 
net rice buyers. Net buyers and subsistence far­
mers are not made worse off by lower food prices. 
In fact, they may be able to increase rice or other 
food consumption because lower rice prices 
increase their market purchasing power. Poor infra­
structure, however, is likely to reduce possible 
benefits to rural consumers because without sig­
nificant investment in physical and market infra­
structure, the cost of transporting imported rice to 
rural areas is still high. Most rice producers are net 
rice sellers and face lower prices for their crops. 
Lower prices also mean that farm laborers receive 
less wage and in-kind payment for their work on 
rice farms.
In 2005, poor, middle-class, and wealthy popula­
tions who lived in the Artibonite Valley rice­
growing areas relied on on-farm crop production 
for less than 40 percent of food sources. Each 
group purchased the majority of what they ate, 
although the poorest group was forced to rely on 
their own labor, payments in-kind, and gifts to ac­
quire sufficient food [FEWSNET 2005],
Haitian Government
Since urban populations have greater access to the 
government, their concerns and demands for lower 
food prices may take precedence in government 
deliberations. Unfortunately, as already described, 
periods of political upheaval following two long 
dictatorships have left the institutional capacity of 
the government limited. A stable political and 
security situation in 2005 could mean that the 
government can spend resources in long-neglected 
areas including agriculture and employment genera­
tion.
U.S. Rice Sector
U.S. rice subsidies account for half of the income 
of U.S. rice farmers (Wailes 2005, 184], so it is 
likely that these producers and the processors and 
traders who benefit from rice production and 
export would fight to keep these subsidies in place, 
regardless of the impact on farmers abroad. Their
responses to changes in Haitian rice policies should 
be taken into account.
International Organizations
In 2004, Haiti owed the International Monetary 
Fund US$9.1 million [IMF 2005], The World Bank, 
IMF, World Trade Organization, United Nations 
Stabilization Mission, and international nongovern­
mental organizations can each influence policy in 
various ways and may have important information 
for designing good policy to reduce poverty and 
hunger. Given low governmental capacity, partner­
ship with these organizations may be necessary in 
both the short and long term.
Policy Options to Reduce Hunger and 
Poverty
Change Trade Policies
The rapid pace of Haiti's trade liberalization did not 
allow time for rice farmers to adjust to changing 
market opportunities, and no social safety net was 
established to assist those in the rice sector. The 
government could have mitigated the effects of 
import liberalization on farmers by establishing a 
higher rate of tariffs, lowering tariffs gradually, or 
increasing technical assistance to farmers to adjust 
to the changing market.
As a “least-developed country," Haiti has the 
flexibility to increase its tariffs [WTO 2010], Alter­
natively, Haiti could choose to violate IMF condi­
tions and enact significant trade barriers at the risk 
of U.S. retaliation [and loss of financial support 
from the IMF and World Bank], Increasing trade 
protections for rice would reduce rice imports and 
increase cereal prices, which would help all net 
cereal sellers, possibly reducing poverty and hunger 
for these farmers. The downside is that it would 
cost more for net cereal buyers, an ever-growing 
population.
On the other hand, Haiti could appeal to the WTO 
and argue that subsidized rice imports from the 
United States have materially harmed its rice far­
mers [as in Case 9-4 and 9-5], If the WTO found in 
favor of Haiti, the country could enact retaliatory 
trade barriers on U.S. rice and possibly other 
commodities unless and until the United States 
reduced rice subsidies. Policy analysts should take
into account any reactions by the U.S. government 
in response to changes in Haiti trade policy.
Invest in Small-Scale Agriculture
Given the limited infrastructure, lack of investment 
in agriculture, and little land available to grow more 
rice, it is not certain Haitian farmers can grow the 
amount of rice that the country is now used to 
consuming without significant investments to 
improve yields and marketing. Since the majority of 
Haitian agriculture is grown on small, family-owned 
plots, investing in these farms and farmers could 
reduce poverty and improve food security in rural 
areas where poverty is more common.
The government could invest in small-scale agricul­
ture by promoting soil erosion prevention activities 
such as reforestation campaigns, implementing 
fertilizer subsidies or supporting the development 
of domestic fertilizer markets, distributing im­
proved seeds, improving credit access, reforming 
land ownership rules, and improving irrigation 
infrastructure. Supporting crop diversification 
could also give farmers additional possible sources 
of income and reduce the negative consequences of 
open trade and rice competition. Additionally, since 
many poor Haitians rely on maize, cassava, and 
yams, the government could attempt to increase 
productivity of these crops. Agricultural extension 
services have been almost nonexistent in Haiti but 
could be developed to help fill the knowledge gap 
in many of these areas.
Invest in Nonagricultural Development
Haiti is vulnerable to natural disasters because of its 
location on a common hurricane path, its environ­
mental degradation, and its lack of risk 
management. Additionally, Haiti has high unem­
ployment, few off-farm employment opportunities, 
and an increasing population. Poor urban and rural 
people rely on wage-earning jobs for income, 
whereas rural middle-class and wealthy people do 
not, so low-skill industry jobs, including jobs 
processing agricultural products and textiles, could 
benefit poor people the most.
In 2006, 27,000 Haitians, many of them women, 
were employed in the apparel sector, down from an 
estimated 100,000 before the embargo [Hornbeck 
2010; Republic of Haiti 2006], The 2008 U.S. 
HOPE II Act [Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement Act] passed by the U.S.
Congress allows duty-free [but not quota-free] im­
ports of Haitian-made apparel to the United States 
for 10 years, and this act has already led to  growth 
in the Haitian apparel industry.1 The textile industry 
has been criticized, however, for paying low wages12 
and having few linkages with the domestic econ­
omy, importing most of its inputs, and exporting 
most of its products.
Assignment
It is 2006 and President-elect Rene Preval is about 
to  start his second term as president. In the con­
text of the rice situation, you are asked to address 
him on how to reduce poverty and hunger 
throughout the country. The country successfully 
pursued improved macroeconomic stability during 
2 0 0 4 -2 0 0 6  and is now in a better position to 
focus on reducing poverty and hunger as it pre­
pares its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. Given 
the available statistics and their uncertainties, what 
would you advise him to  do to  reduce rural and 
urban poverty and hunger? How would your 
answer change in response to  the food price crisis 
in 2007-2008?
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